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LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT SHIELDS 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS FROM EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER 
TITLE IX GEBSER V. LAGO VISTA INDEP. SCHOOL DIST.1 
Shortly after Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delivered the majority opinion 
in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., the local presses were burning 
with harsh criticisms of the opinion.2  The Gebser Court held that school 
districts would not be held liable for damages in teacher-student hostile 
environment sexual harassment claims unless a school district official 
authorized to take remedial measures had actual knowledge of the teacher’s 
misconduct and failed to act to remedy the situation.3  The Court was primarily 
criticized for “making the classroom easier than the office for sexual 
harassers.”4  However, the decision in Gebser followed precedent, legislative 
intent, statutory purpose, and public policy. 
The 5-4 decision was consistent with case precedent because the Supreme 
Court Justices carefully avoided legislating, instead merely construing the 
broad and unclear statute.  Critics who sought a different outcome failed to 
 
 1. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 118 S. Ct 1989  (1998).  During the 
same term, three other major decisions were handed down regarding employer liability in sexual 
harassment cases.  Bernadette Marczely, Mixed Messages: Sexual harassment in public schools, 
The Clearinghouse, May 1, 1999; see also, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellereth, 118 S.Ct. 2259 
(1998) (The Court affirmed appellate court’s reversal of grant of summary judgment to employer 
in case where the employer was unaware of the supervisor’s misconduct); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (1998)(holding that employers are vicariously liable for actionable 
discrimination by a supervisors, but reasonableness employer and plaintiff conduct may be used 
as an affirmative defense); and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998) 
(holding that sexual discrimination includes same sex sexual harassment and is actionable under 
Title VII). 
 2. See e.g. Richard Carelli, Sexual Harassment Lawsuits Against Schools Made Harder by 
Sup. Ct. Damages May Not be Recovered Unless an Official With Powers To Do Something 
About the Problem Knew and Was Indifferent, The Daily Record (Baltimore) June 23, 1998 at 
1C; Margo L. Ely, Bare Majority Strips Students of Sex Harassment Shield , Chicago Daily Law 
Bulletin, Aug. 10, 1998; Deborah L. Rhode, Sex Harassment Remains a Problem in Schools, The 
National Law Journal , Oct. 5, 1998; Linda Greenhouse, School Liability Limited in Sex Cases 
Top Court Split on Harassment, New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 23, 1998, at A1. 
 3. Gebser, 118 S.Ct.  at 1992. 
 4. Ellen Goodman, Mixed Messages on Sexual Harassment, Rocky Mountain News, July 5, 
1998 News 4B.  Goodman’s column criticized the Gebser decision but praised the Court for 
making it easier for employees to succeed on sexual harassment suits by holding an employer 
could be held for a supervisor’s misconduct or inappropriate behavior even if it did not know of 
the violation. 
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realize that the function of Supreme Court Justices is to interpret the law.  The 
responsibility to make laws rests with the legislature.5  Supreme Court Justices 
cannot rewrite a law simply because it yields an unpopular decision.  “[W]hile 
prior court rulings went far afield in permitting damage suits under Title IX, it 
would have been an even greater abuse of congressional intent for the court to 
have decided that school districts were liable for discriminatory practices when 
no official had any inkling of anything amiss.”6 
Furthermore, the language of the statute does not directly address the issue 
of “whether the independent misconduct of a teacher is attributable to the 
school district that employs him under a specific federal statute designed 
primarily to prevent recipients of federal assistance from using the funds in a 
discriminatory manner.”7  Absent an express congressional indication that 
school systems should be liable for private sexual harassment lawsuits, the 
Supreme Court properly concluded that school districts should remain properly 
immune from liability.8 
The Court’s decision also made for good public policy.  Although schools 
will not be held liable for teacher misconduct if the school is unaware of the 
indiscretion, teachers may still be held accountable for their actions.  For 
example, teachers who sexually harass students may face criminal charges.9  
Critics of the decision assume that “the propagation of federal lawsuits is the 
only means of preventing school officials from gross negligence in protecting 
their charges.”10  This “assume[s] that large numbers of them are irresponsible, 
morally demented and uncaring about their future employment.”11  Teachers 
will be deterred from sexually harassing students because of fear of criminal 
and civil prosecution.12  Teachers may also be deterred by the fear of suffering 
pecuniary damages such as large punitive awards and the loss of current and 
future employment in the educational field.13  Consequently, federal lawsuits 
 
 5. A Blow for Common Sense The Issue: Supreme Court Limits Legal Damages Against 
Schools Our View: Majority Followed Clear Legislative Intent, Rocky Mountain News, June 24, 
1998 at 43A. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 2000.  See also 20 U.S.C. ‘‘1681-1688. 
 8. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 2000. 
 9. See supra n. 6. 
 10. Goodman, supra n. 4. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Deborah L. Volberg, Sexual Harassment Under Title IX, The Same But Different, 
N.Y.L.J. July 21, 1998. Plaintiff attorneys may be able to fashion a variety of civil action suits 
against teachers.  “[P]otential causes of action might include negligent hiring, negligent 
supervision, prima facie tort, and intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.” 
 13. Id. “[S]tate courts may provide plaintiff-friendlier forums that the more formal federal 
arena frequented under Title IX.”  However, plaintiffs may seek to avoid civil suits because tort 
claims brought in state court against the teacher may yield small financial awards.  Furthermore, 
schools may argue the Gebser standard should also apply to tort claims. 
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are not the only means of recourse for students.  There are other means of 
deterrence and prevention currently in existence. 
Part I of this casenote provides a definition of sexual harassment, Title IX 
and Title IX’s legislative history.  Part II examines the provisions of Title VII, 
the statute applicable to workplace sexual discrimination and harassment.  In 
addition, this section will examine whether workplace sexual harassment 
claims and sexual harassment claims arising in the educational setting should 
be adjudicated similarly.  Part III will analyze both the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Gebser, focusing on the Court’s interpretation of the statute in 
defining the scope of the remedies available under the act and its application to 
the facts of Gebser.  The last section will analyze how the Court’s holding 
followed case precedent, legislative intent, statutory purpose and made for 
good public policy. 
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT DEFINED 
There are two types of sexual harassment recognized by the US courts.14  
The Supreme Court has defined both quid pro quo and hostile environment 
sexual harassment.15 The definitions of sexual harassment are the same 
regardless of whether the harassment occurs in a school or office setting.16  
Quid pro quo sexual harassment includes “sexual advances, requests for sexual 
acts, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. . .when an 
educational institution, its employees, or its agents make submission to such 
conduct either explicitly or implicitly a condition of a student’s advancement, 
or uses submission to or rejection of such conduct by a student as the basis for 
evaluating or grading a student.”17  The conduct is unwelcome behavior which 
conditions the receipt or denial of benefits on the performance of sexual favors.  
The marked difference between quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual 
harassment is the type of benefit used to inappropriately solicit sexual favors.18  
For example, a student’s grades may be conditioned on compliance with the 
unwelcome behavior in quid pro quo sexual harassment.  In hostile 
 
 14. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1979).  The Court held that “a claim of 
hostile environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.” (internal quotes omitted) Id. 
at 73. 
 15. Id. at 65. The Court relied upon 1980 EEOC Guidelines as authority for recognizing the 
two distinct forms of possible sexual harassment in the employment context. 
 16. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). 
 17. Carrie N. Baker, Proposed Title IX Guideline on Sex-Based Harassment of Students, 43 
EMORY L. J. 271, 293 (1994). 
 18. Id. at 276.This is the common definition of sexual harassment; however, this definition is 
not completely accurate when “applied to sexual abuse and harassment of students, whether 
welcome or not, sexual contact between adults and minors is a criminal act.”  Carol Shakeshaft 
and Audrey Cohen, Sexual abuse of students by school personnel, Phi Delta Kappan, 512, Mar. 
1995. 
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environment sexual harassment the benefit being withheld is a peaceful and 
less stressful school environment.  “[H]ostile environment sexual harassment 
occurs when unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other 
verbal or physical conduct have the effect or purpose of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive environment.”19 The alleged conduct must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive, “so as to alter the conditions of education and create an 
abusive educational environment.”20  An isolated incident of misconduct is not 
sufficient to establish a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment.21 
Despite the differences in the definition of the two types of sexual 
harassment the affects, of the harassment on children are the same regardless if 
the harassment is quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual harassment.  
Sexual harassment may seriously affect a students ability to function both in 
and out of the classroom.22  Students may not want to talk in class; may find it 
difficult to focus on their lessons; may make lower grades; feel “embarrassed, 
less confident, and scared” because of the harassment.23 
In sexual harassment claims, the issue is not whether compliance with or 
submission to the advances was voluntary, but rather whether the alleged 
behavior was unwelcome.24  “To distinguish between actual desire for a 
relationship on one hand, and a mere acquiescence to tendered sexual advances 
on the other, it is necessary to consider the power disparity between the 
individuals involved.”25  A teacher may appear to be a very powerful person to 
a child in school.26  Teachers are “armed with the power to administer 
moderate correction, when,. . .[it is believed]. . . to be just and necessary.  The 
teacher is the substitute of the parent; he is charged in part with the 
 
 19. See Kinman v. Omaha Public School District, 94 F.3d 463, 467 (8th Cir. 1996).  In 
Kinman, a high school student filed suit against the school for sexual harassment by a teacher.  
The court identified the elements of a prima facie case for hostile environment sexual harassment.  
The court held that the “knew or should have known standard” is the appropriate standard for 
applying liability in student teacher sexual harassment claims. Id. at 469. 
 20. Id. at 468. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Jeffery A. Thaler, Are Schools Protecting Children From Harassment?, 35-Aug Trial 32, 
34 (1999). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 468.  The Court of Appeals relied upon the Supreme Court holding 
in Meritor. 
 25. Id. at 468.  The dicta implied that the disparity in status between the accused and the 
accuser may explain why the victims acquiesced to the advances.  Further, the court also noted 
that the question of proof is difficult and is a issue of credibility to be determined by the trier of 
fact. 
 26. See Thaler, supra n. 22  at 34. 
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performance of his duties, and, in the exercise of these delegated duties, is 
invested with his power.”27 
The type of sexual harassment is not determinative of employer liability in 
sexual discrimination and harassment claims.28  The distinctions between quid 
pro quo and hostile environment primarily serve to provide a guide to 
employees in proving claims of sexual harassment.29  For example, in hostile 
environment sexual harassment, the student carries the burden of proof and the 
burden is greater than that of a quid pro quo claim.30  The student must show 
the unwelcome behavior was sufficiently hostile or pervasive enough to disrupt 
the work environment and constitute abuse to put forth a prima facie hostile 
environment sexual harassment claim.31 
II.  TRACING THE CASE HISTORY OF TITLE IX SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits any sex 
discrimination by any “education program or activity receiving Federal” 
support.32  The act provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”33  To 
state a cause of action students must show that they were discriminated against 
in an educational program, that the program received federal funds, and that 
the discrimination was gender based.34  The purpose of the act is to “protect 
 
 27. Id. (citing Patterson v. Nutter, 7A 273, 274 (Me 1886) quoting State v. Pendergrass, 19 
N.C. 365, 365-6 (1837)). 
 28. See Burlington Industries, Inc, 118 S.Ct. at 2264. The Court held that an employer was 
liable although it had no knowledge of the sexual harassment.  Whether harassment was of quid 
pro quo or hostile environment type was not dispositive. 
 29. Id. at 2264.  The Court held that “[t]he terms quid pro quo and hostile environment are 
helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out 
and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility.”  The 
Court noted that the term quid pro quo does not appear in the Title VII statute and first appeared 
in academic literature and was later applied in Meritor.  Further, the Court finds that Meritor’s 
discussion of the two terms “served a limited and specific purpose” of aiding the court in 
determining whether an employer’s conduct constituted sexual discrimination or harassment for 
the purposes of Title VII. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 2265. 
 32. 20 U.S.C. ‘‘1681-1688 (1994). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Gregory G. Pinski, Civil Rights—Federal Remedies: The Eighth Circuit Recognized 
Same-Sex Harassment Under Title IX and Adopts the “Knew or Should have Known Standard for 
School District Liability,” 74 N.D. L. REV. 141, 145 (1994). 
To successfully prove a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment, in addition, to 
the basic Title IX elements delineated above, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that he or she is a 
member of a protected group; (2) that the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment; 
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individuals from sex discrimination by denying federal financial aid to those 
educational institutions that bear responsibility for sexually discriminatory 
practices.”35 
Title IX was enacted through the Spending Powers Clause.36  The Supreme 
Court determined the statute was a Spending Powers statute because it 
concerns the expenditure of federal funds.37  “Title IX is essentially a contract 
 
(3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the charged sexual harassment had 
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s education and created an intimidating, hostile 
or offensive educational environment that seriously effected the psychological well-being 
of the plaintiff; and (5) that some basis for institutional liability has been established.” 
Students may show they are members of a protected group by introducing evidence that 
“members of one sex are exposed to disadvantages, terms or conditions,” to which members of 
the opposite sex are not. 
  The second element may be met by introducing evidence that the harassment was 
unsolicited.  Factors such as a student’s age, the nature of the harassment, and the degree of 
authority exercised over the student are considered in determining whether the harassment was 
unsolicited.  Considerations of a student’s age address a harassers affirmative defense of consent.  
Younger students are presumed unable to consent to a sexual relationship with an adult. 
  To prove the third element the student must show, that “but for the [student’s] sex, that 
harassment would not have occurred.”  Last, to prove the fourth element a student must show that 
the harassment severely or sufficiently altered the student’s educational environment.  Id. at 146.  
Students must show that the harassment was pervasive and habitual to establish severity or a 
sufficient effect on the educational environment. 
 35. Id. at 144.  “Legislative history shows a determination to remedy “access factors.” such 
as admission standards and hiring procedures, which have historically denied women the 
opportunity to enter academic institutions.”  Kimberly A. Mango, Students Versus Professors 
Combating Sexual Harassment Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN. 
L. REV. 355, 372 (1991).  There was little focus on sex discrimination after women gained access 
to educational opportunities once denied to them. 
 36. Elizabeth G. Livingston, Canutillo Independent School District v. Leija: Imputing 
Liability For Teacher Student Sexual Harassment Under Title IX, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1849, 1851 
(1997).  See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 708-9 (1997).  Title IX may be 
interpreted as a statute enacted through the Spending Powers Clause because it uses the same 
language and was modeled after another act authorized by the Spending Powers Clause, Title VI.  
Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School, 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1996) (held no Title IX 
liability imposed on school’s in peer hostile environment sexual harassment claims unless the 
school directly discriminates on the basis of sex). 
 37. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708-709.  In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pubic Schools, the Court 
refused to revisit the issue of what congressional power authorized the statute, despite the 
school’s argument the statute was not created solely under Congress’ Spending Clause powers. 
503 U.S. 60, 75 n. 8 (1992)(“[M]oney damages remedy available under Title IX for an intentional 
violation” of the statute.)  The Court held the constitutional source of Congress’ authority to enact 
the statute was immaterial because money damages were available irrespective of the source of 
the Congress’ authority. 
  The school in Franklin, argued that the statute was also enacted under congressional 
powers derived from ‘5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, in Rowinsky v. Bryan 
Independent School, the court noted that, “[w]hile the receipt of state funding may transform a 
private school into a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, the receipt of federal funds 
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between the federal government and educational institutions.”38  The statute 
conditions the grant of federal funds on a school’s agreement not to 
discriminate on the basis of gender.39  Only schools receiving federal funds are 
bound by the legislation and subject to liability for their failure to comply with 
the grant’s conditions.40  “While it is plausible that the condition[s] imposed 
could encompass ending discriminatory behavior by third parties, the more 
probable inference is that the condition[s] prohibit certain behavior by the 
grant recipients themselves”.41 
Title IX sexual harassment claims have gradually expanded the scope of 
the statute while not departing from the original purpose of the statute.42  At 
the time of the statute’s adoption in 1972, neither gender discrimination suits 
nor claims of sexual harassment were commonplace.43  Since there was limited 
case law and litigation on the issues, the scope of the act remained limited.44  
As society developed and changed and the roles of women in society 
underwent dramatic changes, new issues began to arise as sex discrimination 
and sexual harassment litigation began to flood the courts.45 
In one of a series of early groundbreaking cases interpreting the act, the 
Supreme Court recognized that Title IX is enforceable through a private right 
of action.46  In Cannon v. University of Chicago, a female student alleged that 
her application for admission to medical school was denied on the basis of 
sex.47  The Court of Appeals held that Title IX did not authorize a right to 
 
does not make a private school a state actor.”  80 F.3d at 1013 n. 14.  It would exceed the bounds 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose liability on private schools not receiving state funds.  
The courts are hesitant to recognize the Fourteenth Amendment as Congress’ authority for 
enacting legislation because of the absolute obligations Fourteenth Amendment legislation places 
on the states. 
  In Rowinsky, the court also noted that statutes enacted under the authority of the 
Fourteenth Amendment tend to impede upon traditional state autonomy.  Id.  The courts are also 
hesitant to tread upon traditional notions of state autonomy. 
 38. Marczely, supra n. 1. 
 39. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013.  See also 20 U.S.C. ‘1681 (1994). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Mango, supra n. 33 at 380. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  A review conducted by the National Advisory Council on Women’s Educational 
Programs collected several anecdotes by female students detailing the existence of sexual 
harassment and the need for regulation.  (citing F. Till, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, A REPORT ON 
THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
WOMEN’S EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS (Aug. 1980)). 
 46. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677. 
 47. Id. at 680.  The Supreme Court had yet to hear a case of hostile environment sexual 
harassment and consequently had yet to release a holding that sexual harassment was a form of 
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private action, although Cannon’s allegations were accepted as true.48  The 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision based upon two factors.49  
The Court found that Cannon was excluded on the basis of sex and that the 
school in question was the recipient of federal financial assistance.50  The 
statute expressly states that education programs or activities receiving federal 
funds are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of gender.51  Cannon 
established (1) that the alleged school did receive federal financial assistance52 
and (2) that the decision to reject her application was circumstantially based 
upon her sex.53  Consequently, the Court held that the school clearly violated 
Title IX. 
While the Court easily made the determination that a violation had 
occurred based on the express language of the statute, the Court had difficulty 
finding an expressed right to private action evidenced in the statute.54  The 
right to private action was inferred from a close analysis of Congressional 
intent, legislative history, and a plain reading of the statute.55  On conclusion of 
its in-depth survey the Court held that Cannon belonged to a class which the 
statute was enacted to protect56 and that the legislative history indicated an 
intent to create a private cause of action.57  Furthermore, the Court noted that 
an implied right of action would not frustrate the purpose of the act.58  “The 
award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prosecuted her own suit 
is not only sensible but is also fully consistent with—and in some cases even 
necessary to the orderly enforcement of the statute,” held the Court.59  Cannon 
marked the beginning of the expansion of the scope of Title IX by expanding 
the scope of Title IX to include the right of private action. 
 
sexual discrimination.  Cannon is relevant because it is the basis for all private actions arising 
under Title IX. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 689.  The failure to admit the student on the basis of sex was evidenced by the 
school admission criteria. 
 51. See 20 U.S.C. ‘1681 (1994). 
 52. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680 n. 2. The school admitted receipt of federal financial assistance. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 683.  The apparent difficulty existed because the statute does not expressly grant a 
private right of action. 
 55. Id. at 683-684. 
 56. Id. at 684. 
 57. Id. at 694.  (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (Cort v. Ash., 422 US 66, 82 (1975)).  In 
Cort the Court held “it was not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, 
although an explicit purpose to deny such a cause of action would be controlling.” 
 58. Id. at 705-706. 
 59. Id. at 708.  Before the Cannon ruling the Court found a private right of action in six 
other cases and damage remedies in three of those six cases.  Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72. 
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Since the Cannon ruling, Congress has amended Title IX twice, never 
reversing the Cannon holding of an implied right of private action.60  The 
Supreme Court noted Congress’ silence in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools and held that Congress’ acquiescence to the Cannon holding failed to 
limit the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX.61 
In Franklin, a high school student was subjected to continued sexual 
harassment by a sports coach and teacher employed by the school district.  
Teachers and school district administrators learned of the harassment, but 
failed to act appropriately to address the problem and put an end to the sexual 
harassment.  Rather than attempting to halt the harassment, the teachers and 
school administrators discouraged the student from filing charges.  The teacher 
later resigned on the condition that the charges be dropped and the school 
administrators cease their investigation.  The District Court dismissed the 
claim finding Title IX did not authorize damage awards and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed.62  The Supreme Court reversed, and held that remedies are 
presumed unless Congress has prescribed otherwise.63 
Following Cannon and Franklin, the lower federal courts shifted their 
attention towards setting the standard for when employer liability would be 
imposed in student teacher sexual harassment claims.64  The recovery of 
damages from employers in sexual harassment claims is predicated on the 
showing of institutional liability.65  “Due to the slow development of legal 
standards under Title IX, courts have often looked to standards for employer 
liability under Title VII for guidance when considering institutional liability 
for Title IX claims.”66 
Before Gebser there was a division among the courts regarding the 
appropriate standard for school district liability under Title IX.67  “These 
standards include[d] (1) strict liability for school district or institutional 
liability, (2) institutional liability if the school district knowingly failed to act, 
(3) no institutional liability unless there was direct discrimination, and (4) 
liability if the school district knew or should have known of the 
discrimination.”68  The Fifth  and Seventh  Circuits did not apply strict liability 
 
 60. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73.  “Congress made no effort to restrict the right of action 
recognized in Cannon. . . or to alter the traditional presumption in favor of a federal right.” 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 64. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 469. 
 65. Pinski, supra n. 34 at 148. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 149. 
 68. Id. 
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or agency principles to Title IX claims of sex discrimination.69  Instead, both 
circuits held that school districts would not be held liable for an employee’s 
misconduct unless a school district employee with the authority to end the 
abuse knew of the abuse and failed to act to end the abuse.70  Meanwhile, the 
Second, Eighth, Sixth, and Fourth  Circuits “embraced the Title VII standards 
of liability for Title IX claims.71 
Before the enactment of Title IX no statute addressed gender 
discrimination.72  However, there was a statute to address racial and ethnic 
discrimination, Title VI, which Title IX is closely modeled after.  Title VI 
reads in part: “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of race, color, 
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance.”73  “The purpose of Title VI is to end 
discrimination based on race, color or national origin in any program or 
activity receiving federal funds including discrimination in educational 
institutions.”74  The conditions for the grant of federal funds under Title VI are 
clear.75  Schools receiving federal funds under Title VI “must conform to the 
antidiscrimination policy set by Title VI or be denied continued access to the 
federal monies often necessary to the continued survival of the institution.76 
Cases brought under Title VI in the educational context tend to address 
racially discrimination admission policies and their effects upon minorities.77  
“Title VI was long seen as the way to remedy discrimination against minorities 
in the admission policy.”78  Although Title VI adequately addressed issues of 
race discrimination and their effect upon minorities, it did not address the issue 
of gender discrimination. 
 
 69. See Kelly Frels and Lisa A. Brown, Dangerous Liaisons It’s Up To The Supreme Court 
to Chart The liability Of School Districts For A Teacher’s Sexual Harassment Of A Student, 
Texas Lawyer, Jan. 26, 1998 at 24. The article analyzed lower court rulings regarding school 
district liability in sexual harassment cases involving teachers harassing students. 
 70. See generally, Canutillo Indep. School Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996); Rosa 
H. v. San Elizario Indep. School Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Metropolitan School 
Dist., 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 71. Frels and Brown, supra n. 69. 
 72. Mango, supra n.35 at 366. 
 73. See 42 U.S.C. ‘2000d (1994). 
 74. Elizabeth J. Grant, Applying “Title VII Hostile Work Environment” Analysis to Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972 An Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-to Student 
Sexual Harassment in the Schools, 98 DICK. L. REV. 489, 495 (1994). 
 75. Mango, supra n.35 at 362. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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The statutory language of Title IX is similar to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
Title VI.79  In addition to the similar language in the statutes, both statutes 
share a similar purpose.  Both Title VI and Title IX seek to prohibit 
discrimination in the admission policies of educational institutions.80  Title VI 
focuses on addressing discrimination on the basis of race or national origin.  
Meanwhile, Title IX focuses on prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
gender in admission decisions.  Essentially the two statutes are contracts 
between the federal government and grant recipients.81  The federal 
government promises to provide needed financial assistance to educational 
programs on the condition that the educational programs do not discriminate 
on the grounds of race, color or national origin under Title VI; nor on the 
grounds of sex under Title IX.82 
It may be inferred from the similarity in the statutory language of Title IX 
and Title VI that the same legal standards should apply to both statutes.83  
However, “[t]he problem for the student litigant under this scheme is that she 
would be forced to refer to another federal statute and regulatory scheme 
equally silent on the existence of environmental harassment and less flexible in 
response to student-victim’s needs.”84 
After examining the Title VI legislative history and comparing the 
statutory language of Title IX and Title VI, the Court in Cannon noted 
additional similarities.85  “Both statutes provide the same administrative 
mechanism for terminating federal financial support for institutions engaged in 
prohibited discrimination.”86  In addition, neither statute expressly provides for 
a private right of action.87  The Court reasoned that the language of Title VI 
 
 79. 42 U.S.C. ‘2000d.  “Except for the substitution of the word “sex” in Title IX to replace 
the words “race, color, or national origin” in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to 
describe the benefitted class.”  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-695. 
 80. Mango, supra n. 35 at 387.  There is a marked difference between Title IX and Title VI.  
Title VI  applies to all programs receiving federal funds, not just educational programs.  See 42 
U.S.C. ‘2000d (1994). 
 81. Guardians Association, etc. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 463 
U.S. 582, 599(1983). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Mango, supra n. 35 at 387. 
 84. Id. at 385.  There are concerns about what adjudicatory standard to apply because of 
silence in the statue and its regulations and an unclear legislative history of the congressional 
intent as to “who Title IX was designed to help and in what capacity.”  Id. at 384. 
 85. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-6.  Cannon laid the procedural foundation for comparisons 
between Title IX and Title VI.  Mango, supra n. 33 at 387. 
 86. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695-6. 
 87. Id.  The Court reasoned that Congress assumed Title IX would be construed similar to 
Title VI.  The Court’s conclusion was based upon the statements of Senator Birch Bayh, a 
Democrat from Indiana and staunch supporter of women’s rights, during the congressional 
debates regarding the enactment of Title IX.  Id. at 696 n. 19 (noting Senator Bayh’s advocacy of 
women’s rights). 
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had been interpreted to provide a private right of action and Congress knew or 
should have known the law when it enacted Title XI with the same language as 
the already construed and generally accepted interpretation of Title VI.88  The 
Court assumed that the congressional representatives, “were aware [of] the 
prior interpretation [of Title VI].”89  In addition, the Court assumed Congress’ 
silence following the previous interpretation reflected Congress intent with 
respect to Title IX.90 
The Court’s presumptions are supported by the regulatory scheme of Title 
IX.91  Title IX defers to Title VI for procedure.92  Title IX procedures outline, 
“a system of evidence, a code of conduct for investigations, and a provision for 
judicial review.”93  “Such deference is perhaps the clearest indication by the 
Department of Education that the two statutes are aimed at remedying so 
nearly the same grievance, that any established procedure to dealing with 
complaints under one is necessarily applicable and adequate to deal with 
complaints under the other.” 
Although Title IX and Title VI bear some strong similarities, historically 
the courts have applied different legal standards in analyzing race and gender 
discrimination suits.94  The different standards apply because gender 
classifications and discrimination are not considered suspect.  Discrimination 
against women does not rise to the level of the “traditional indicia of 
suspectness.”95  Consequently, the courts turn to Title VII for guidance in 
interpreting Title IX.96 
Title VII provides in part: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer. . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
 
  In Cannon, the Court relied upon its interpretation of Title VI in finding an implied right 
of private action for violations of Title IX.  Id. at 696. 
 88. Id. at 696-697.  The Court noted that a distinguished Fifth Circuit Court of appeals 
opinion had been cited with approval and not questioned for the five years leading up to the 
Cannon holding.  The noted opinion was written by Judge Wisdom and the panel included then 
Judge (Chief) Brown and then Judge (Chief Justice) Burger.  See e.g. Bossier Parish School 
Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967). Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698 n. 20. 
 89. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 697. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Mango, supra n. 35 at 386. 
 92. See 34 C.F.R. ‘106.71 (1997). 
 93. Mango, supra n. 35 at 387. 
 94. For example, the courts apply strict scrutiny to any statute that is based on a suspect 
classification such as race.  See e.g. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).  Intermediate 
scrutiny applies in gender discrimination cases.  See e.g Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 95. Discrimination is suspect when the victimized “class [is]. . .subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”  San Antonio Indep. 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1993). 
 96. Neera Rellan Stacy, Seeking a Superior Institutional Liability Standard Under Title IX 
for Tteacher-Student Sexual Harassment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1338, 1347 (1996). 
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individuals race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”97  Title VII allows for 
the recovery of monetary damages with a cap of up to $300, 000.98  When 
Congress amended Title VII to allow for the recovery of monetary damages, 
this broadened the scope of Title VII.99 
The Courts have recognized two types of sexual harassment under Title 
VII, quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment.100  Since Title 
VII recognizes two types of sexual harassment it is frequently used as a guide 
to interpreting Title IX.101  Furthermore, since both Title VII and Title IX 
address the issue of sex discrimination, the courts are inclined to look toward 
Title VII for guidance in deciding Title IX cases.102 
III. GEBSER V. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Gebser resolved the issue of what standard of liability to impose in 
teacher-student sexual harassment cases.  In Gebser, the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue of when a school district may be liable under Title IX for 
sexual harassment by one of its teachers against one of its students.103  The 
Court held that it “will not hold a school district liable for damages under Title 
IX for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and 
deliberate indifference.”104 
While Gebser was a student in high school her teacher began making 
inappropriate comments to her.  The comments continued and the teacher later 
initiated a sexual relationship with Gebser.  Gebser did not report the teacher’s 
misconduct105 and the relationship continued until the two were caught by 
police engaging in sexual relations.  The teacher was arrested, fired by the 
school district and had his teacher’s license revoked by the state.  Before his 
arrest the school had received only one notice about the teacher’s misconduct 
when the parents of two students complained about a comment made by the 
teacher in the class.  The teacher was advised by the high school principal to be 
 
 97. 42 U.S.C. ‘2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). 
 98. Before 1991 only injunctions and equitable relief were available.  , Kaija Clark, School 
Liability And Compensation for Title VI Sexual Harassment Violations By Teacher And Peers, 66 
GEO. WASH.L.REV. 352, 361 (1998). 
 99. Id. at 362.  Remedies traditionally associated with Tort actions were made available to 
litigants. 
 100. See generally, Meritor, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)(explained there are two types of sexual 
harassment). 
 101. Clark, supra n. 98 at 363. 
 102. Baker, supra n. 18 at 286. 
 103. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1993. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Gebser testified that “although she realized. . .[the teacher’s] conduct was improper, she 
was uncertain how to react and she wanted to continue to have him as a teacher.”  Marczely, 
supra n. 1. 
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more careful with his comments and the school guidance counselor was made 
aware of the principal’s meeting with the teacher.  The school district 
superintendent and Title IX coordinator, however, were not made aware of the 
any of parental complaints or of the principal’s meeting with the teacher. 
After the arrest, Gebser filed suit in state court against the school district 
and the teacher.  The case was removed to the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Texas which held that Gebser failed to raise a genuine 
issue as to whether the school district had notice of the harassment, and 
granted summary judgment in favor of the school.  The Court then remanded 
the claims against the teacher to state court.106  “[T]he court determine[d] the 
parents’ complaint to the principal concerning . . .[the teacher’s] comments in 
class . . .[was] the only [notice] Lago Vista had received about . . .[the teacher], 
and that evidence was inadequate to raise a genuine issue on whether the 
school district had actual or constructive notice that the teacher was involved 
in a sexual relationship with a student.”107  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court holding.  The court held that Gebser failed to meet 
her burden of proof because she failed to establish the school had notice of the 
alleged sexual harassment.108 In addition, the court held that strict liability was 
not consistent with the purpose of Title IX and that the agency principles of 
vicarious liability did not apply in the educational context.109  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and affirmed.110 
Gebser advanced two theories under which Lago Vista could be held liable 
for the teacher’s misconduct.111  First, Gebser sought to hold the school liable 
under a theory of respondeat superior, vicarious or imputed liability.112  
“[U]nder which recovery in damages against a school district would generally 
follow whenever a teacher’s authority over a student facilitates harassment.”113  
Second, Gebser contended the school should be held liable at a minimum 
under the alternate theory of constructive notice.114  Under a constructive 
notice theory, a school district would be liable under Title IX, for a teacher’s 
 
 106. Id.  Gebser also sued the school district for negligence and under ‘1983, in addition to 
the  violations of Title IX .  Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir. 
1997).  She later conceded her negligence claim could not succeed under Texas law.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment on both the ‘1983 and Title IX claims. . 
 107. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1994. 
 108. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 106 F.3d at 1223-1224.  The Court of Appeals granted 
the school’s motion for summary judgement based upon its holding in Rosa H. v. San Elizario 
Indep. School Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997), and Canutillo Indep. School Dist. v. Leija, 101 
F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 109. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 106 F.3d at 1223-1224. 
 110. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1994. 
 111. Id. at 1995. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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misconduct if the district knew or should have known about the harassment, 
but failed to act to remedy the discrimination.115 
The majority found that Gebser’s petition for damages under the theories 
of respondeat superior and constructive notice were the “most critical in 
resolving the case.”116  Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas,  reasoned that since Congress had not 
specifically addressed the issue of damages or relief under Title IX, and 
because there was no legislative history indicative of intent regarding monetary 
damages the Court had a wide degree of  “latitude to shape a sensible remedial 
scheme that best comported with the statute.”117 
The majority used Title IX as a guide in fashioning its remedial scheme to 
avoid creating a remedy exceeding the statute’s scope and purpose.118  After 
analyzing the statute the majority concluded that it would “frustrate the 
purposes of Title IX to permit damages recovery against a school district for a 
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student based on principles of respondeat 
superior or constructive notice, i.e. without actual notice to a school district 
official.”119  Much of Justice O’Connor’s analysis concerning Congress’ intent 
was based upon a comparison of Title IX and Title VII.120  For example, she 
reasoned that Congress’ silence on the subjects of both a private right of action 
and a monetary damages remedy were evidence Congress did not intend to 
 
 115. Id.  The Court found that the issue of “whether educational institutions [could]. . . be said 
to violate Title IX based solely on principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice was not 
resolved by Franklin’s citation of Meritor.”  Furthermore, the reference to Meritor in Franklin 
was made to establish that sexual harassment did constitute sexual discrimination under Title IX. 
  The school district’s liability in Franklin did not turn on any constructive notice or 
imputed liability theories because the school district knew of the sexual harassment, but failed to 
take any action to remedy the situation.  Franklin, 503 U.S., at 64. 
  In addition, the majority found that the language of Title IX did not support the 
application of agency principles as a legal standard.  Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1996.  The majority 
reasoned that Meritor’s application of agency principles as a guide to imputed liability under Title 
VII applied because of the statutory language of Title VII which expressly indicates an intent for 
agency principles to apply.  Id. at 1996.  The Court found no such statutory language suggesting 
agency principles should apply to Title IX claims.  The Court also noted that Title VII explicitly 
defines any employee to include any agent.  See also 42 U.S.C. ‘2000e(b)(1994).  Again, the 
Court noted the absence of agency language in Title IX. 
 116. Gebser, 118 S.Ct., at 1996. 
 117. Id. The Court recognized that Title VII has an express cause of action, provides for 
monetary damages, and has a cap on the amount of monetary damages available to successful 
litigants.  See also ‘2000e-5(f) (provides an express cause of action); ‘1981a (provides for 
monetary damages); ‘1981a(b) (places a cap on the amount of monetary damages available).  The 
Court found no express provision contained in Title IX.  Furthermore, the judicially recognized 
cause of action and absence of express congressional intent authorized a judicially constructed 
remedial scheme.  Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1996. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1997 (internal quotes omitted). 
 120. Id. at 1997. 
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provide recovery of monetary damages as a remedy.121  Civil rights statutes 
enacted before Title IX had included an express right to action.122  These 
statutes did not provide for the recovery of monetary damages; rather they 
provided for injunctive and equitable relief.123  In addition, Justice O’Connor 
noted that Congress did not make provisions for recovery of monetary awards 
under Title VII until 1991.124  Even then, Congress placed a cap on the amount 
of monetary damages recoverable.125  Therefore, based upon Congress’ refusal 
to permit the unlimited recovery of monetary damages under other civil rights 
statutes, Justice O’Connor concluded that Title IX should not permit the 
unlimited recovery of monetary damages in private action litigation.126  Justice 
O’Connor cited to Title VII which, although it permitted the award or of 
monetary damages, limited the available recovery to an individual.127 The 
maximum recovery under Title VII for violations is closely linked to the size 
of the employer.128  Justice O’Connor wrote, “adopting . . .[Gebser’s] position 
would amount, then, to allowing unlimited recovery of damages under Title IX 
where Congress has not spoken on the subject of either the right or the remedy, 
and in the face of evidence that when Congress expressly considered both in 
Title VII it restricted the amount of damages available.”129 
Relying on the case precedent established by Cannon, Justice O’Connor 
found that the purpose of Title IX was to avoid the use of federal funds to 
support discriminatory practices.130  She also acknowledged that the statute 
was patterned after the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that “[t]he two statutes 
operate in the same manner, conditioning an offer of federal funding on a 
promise by the recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts to a contract 
between the Government and the recipient of funds.”131  It is the contractual 
framework of Title IX that distinguishes it from Title VII.132  Title VII 
expressly prohibits discrimination regardless of whether or not an employer 
receives federal funds.133  “Title VII aims centrally to compensate victims of 
discrimination, [while] Title IX focuses more on ‘protecting’ individuals from 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. ‘2000a-3(a) (1970 ed.); ‘2000e-5(e), (g) (1970 ed. Supp.II). 
 124. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1997. 
 125. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. ‘1981a(b)(3)). 
 126. Id. at 1997. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  See also ‘2000e-2. 
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discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal funds.”134  The 
contractual framework of Title IX was crucial to the holding because “[w]hen 
Congress attache[s] conditions to the award of federal funds under its spending 
power, U.S. Const., Art. I ‘8, cl. 1, as it ha[d] in Title IX and Title VI,. . .[the 
Court has] examine[d] closely the propriety of private actions holding the 
recipient liable in monetary damages for noncompliance with the condition.”135  
In Gebser, special attention was paid toward ensuring that the recipient of 
federal funds had notice that it would be liable for monetary damages.136  
Actual notice is required because the recipient of federal funds may be 
unaware of its violation of the conditions of the grant, and the majority 
“assume[d] that Congress did not envision a recipient’s liability in damages in 
that situation.”137 
In addition, the text of the statute and its regulations aided the majority in 
concluding that Congress did not intend to allow recovery of damages under 
respondeat superior or absent actual notice.138The administrative enforcement 
procedures indicated “Congress did not intend to allow recovery in damages 
where liability rests solely on principles of vicarious liability or constructive 
notice.”139  Justice O’Connor noted that grant recipients are provided with 
actual notice of their failure to comply with express conditions of their contract 
with the government, and afforded the opportunity to remedy the situation. 
Upon continued noncompliance, the government takes further action which 
may include termination of assistance or refusal to grant or continue federal 
assistance.140 
 
 134. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1997.  The Court found that this distinction explained why the 
Court, in Cannon, “[referred] to injunctive or equitable relief in a private action, but not to a 
damages remedy.”  Id. at 1997-8 (citations omitted). 
 135. Id. at 1997. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 1998.  In Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. School Dist., the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that “[w]hen the school board accepted federal funds, it agreed not to discriminate 
on the basis of sex. . .[it is] unlikely that it further agreed to suffer liability whenever its 
employees discriminate on the basis of sex.”  106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997) (held Title IX 
does not create liability on the part of a public school for negligently failing to prevent a teacher 
from sexually abusing a student). 
The Court reasoned that, “[a]s a statute enacted under the Spending Clause Title IX should not 
generate liability unless the recipient of federal funds agreed to assume liability.” 
 138. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1998. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  See also 20 U.S.C. ‘1682 (1994) which reads in part: “That no such action shall be 
taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of 
the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured 
by voluntary means.” 
  In addition, the administrative regulations prohibit the government from beginning 
enforcement actions until the grant recipient has been notified, afforded the opportunity to 
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The purpose of requiring notice is to provide the grant recipient with the 
opportunity to bring its actions into compliance with the statute before much-
needed federal funds are diverted “from beneficial uses when a recipient was 
unaware of discrimination in its programs and is willing to institute prompt 
corrective measures.”141  Justice O’Connor found that the relief sought by 
Gebser was contrary to the purpose of the notice requirement.142  The majority 
found that it would not be prudent for the judicial scheme of enforcement to be 
contrary to the statute’s express administrative enforcement policies.143  
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor feared that “an award of damages in a 
particular case might well exceed a recipients level of federal funding.”144  For 
instance, “many school districts receive relatively small amounts of federal 
money, $120,000 a year in the case of Lago Vista.”145  However, “jury verdicts 
in sexual harassment cases can exceed $1 million.”146 
Justice O’Connor concluded that the judicial remedies available under 
Title IX should comply with the Congressional intent expressed in the 
language of Title IX and the administrative enforcement regulations.147  She 
proceeded to interpret the regulations and provide guidance to future 
litigants.148  She wrote “in cases like this one that do not involve the official 
policy of the recipient entity, we hold that a damages remedy will not lie under 
Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the 
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient’s 
behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient’s programs and 
fails adequately to respond.”149 
A school district must respond with deliberate indifference to meet the 
discrimination component of the statute.150  The Court based its findings on the 
express language in the administrative enforcement scheme.151  The basis of a 
cause of action under Title IX must be an official action by the grant recipient, 
and no action can be taken absent actual notice and a response.152  The 
 
remedy the violation, and it has been determined that voluntary compliance is not attainable.  See 
34 C.F.R. ‘100.8(c),(d)(1997). 
 141. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1999. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Greenhouse, supra n. 2 (citing school board brief). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Gebser, 118 S. Ct at 1999. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  The Court found that “[t]he administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that an 
official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into 
compliance.” 
 152. Id. 
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recipient must officially act in a discriminatory manner.153  Absent a standard 
of deliberate indifference a school district would be held liable not for its own 
official actions, but for the misconduct of one of its “employee’s independent 
actions.”154 
After concluding that schools would not be held liable under Title IX 
absent actual notice of sex discrimination and deliberate indifference by an 
official with the authority to remedy discriminatory practices, the Court 
applied the facts of Gebser to the new rule and concluded that the school 
district was not liable under Title IX.155  First, Gebser conceded that she should 
not prevail under the actual notice standard.156  The only school official with 
knowledge of any misconduct was the principal, and he knew only of 
inappropriate comments the teacher had made in class.157  Consequently, the 
Court concluded that the school district lacked actual notice.158 
Second, upon learning of its employee’s misconduct, the school district 
took appropriate action to remedy the situation by  terminating the teacher.159  
This official decision adequately addressed the problem and did not constitute 
deliberate indifference.160  The majority concluded its opinion by 
acknowledging that sexual harassment of students was not uncommon, but 
announced that it would “not hold a school district liable in damages under 
Title IX for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student absent actual notice and 
deliberate indifference,” unless Congress enacted legislation directly 
addressing the issue.161  In concluding the majority opinion Justice O’Connor 
acknowledged the harm caused by sexual harassment in the educational 
context and the availability of other means of redress available to injured 
students.162  It may be inferred that Justice O’Connor realized the opinion 
might draw criticism and be seen as making sexual harassment suits more 
difficult for injured students to pursue.163  However, the acknowledgment of 
other remedies available showed that students were not left without any legal 
recourse after Gebser.  The holding simply meant that to successfully bring a 
suit under Title IX, students alleging sexual harassment would have to show 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  The deliberate indifference standard also applies to causes of action under ‘1983. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1999. 
 157. Id. at 2000. 
 158. Id.  The Court declared that the teacher’s knowledge of his misconduct was not 
pertinent. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  The Court stated that its holding did not effect a students ability to bring suits against 
a school district under state law or “against the teacher in his individual capacity or under 42 
U.S.C. 1983.” 
 163. Id. 
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that an official with the authority to remedy the situation failed to act 
appropriately.  Justice O’Connor and the majority carefully noted that sexual 
harassment suits holding school districts liable for a teacher’s misconduct suits 
are not barred by Title IX, but that specific evidence of knowledge must be 
shown for students to succeed in a private action against the school district 
under Title IX. 
Justice Stevens joined by Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice 
Breyer dissented.  Justice Stevens accused the majority of failing to accurately 
interpret the statute, failing to adhere faithfully to the Court’s duty to interpret 
the law, straying from Court precedent and thwarting the purpose of Title 
IX.164  While Justice Stevens noted that Congress took no express action 
contrary to the Court’s holdings in Cannon and Franklin,165 he interpreted 
Congress’ silence as validation of the Court’s previous holdings as well as an 
indication of Congress’ implicit acknowledgment that damages are 
available.166 
Justice Stevens concluded that, “[b]ecause these constructions of the 
statute have been accepted by Congress and are unchallenged here, they have 
the same legal effect as if the private cause of action seeking damages had 
been explicitly rather than implicitly, authorized by Congress.”167  Therefore, 
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority’s presumption that the Court had a 
wide degree of latitude in accessing the appropriate remedy available under 
Title IX.168  Instead, Justice Stevens asserted that the Court should have 
adhered to the “text of the statute and settled legal principles.”169  Although, 
Justice Stevens did not believe that the Court had a wide degree of latitude, he 
did believe the remedies available under Title IX should be as broad as the 
scope of Title IX.170  The majority’s holding was not far reaching enough 
according to Justice Stevens, because it was “at odds with settled principles of 
agency law.”171  Justice Stevens advocated the application of agency principles 
because (1) the teacher’s misuse of the authority vested in him through his 
employment relationship with the school district “allowed him to abuse his 
young students’ trust,”172 and (2) the absence of the use of the term ‘agent’ in 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 2002. 
 166. Id.  (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 78, Justice Scalia concurring).  Congress amended Title 
IX after the Court’s ruling in Cannon to “eliminate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.”  
See also 42 U.S.C. ‘2000d-7(a)(1). 
 167. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 2002. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 2003. 
 172. Id. 
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the text of the statute is not dispositive.”173  Justice Stevens noted that, “the 
Court suggest[ed] that agency principles are inapplicable to this case because 
Title IX does not expressly refer to an “agent” as Title VII does.174  “Title IX’s 
focus on the protected classes rather than the fund recipient fully explains the 
statute’s failure to mention “agents” of the recipient,” argued Justice Stevens in 
a footnote.175  Furthermore, Justice Stevens reasoned that Title VII’s agency 
language was limiting language.176  He opined, “Congress’ decision to define 
‘employee’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer,. . .surely envince[d] an 
intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under 
Title VII are to be held liable.”177  Justice Stevens relied heavily on the 
restatement of Torts and agency principles in his dissent.178  He also asserted 
that the Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights interpretation of the 
statute was significant.”179  The Department of Education promulgated a policy 
that stated that, school districts should be held liable if teachers are “aided in 
carrying out the sexual harassment of students by his or her position of 
authority with the institution.”180 
Justice Stevens also found the majority’s carefully constructed rule 
thwarted the purpose of Title IX.181  He argued that the rule did not provide 
any incentive for school districts “to adopt and enforce practices 
that. . .[would] minimize the danger that vulnerable students. . .[would] be 
exposed to such odious behavior.”182  He reasoned that the rule allowed school 
districts to insulate themselves from knowledge of a teacher’s misconduct to 
shield themselves from liability.183  Justice Stevens refrained from denouncing 
 
 173. Id. at 2004, n. 9.  Justice Stevens found that, “Title IX’s focus on the protected class 
rather that the fund recipient fully explained the statute’s failure to mention “agents” of the 
recipient, however. . . Title VII’s reference to an “agent” as a limitation on the liability of the 
employer.” 
  In addition, Justice Stevens advocated the application of agency principles because it 
Acomport[ed] with the relevant agency’s interpretation of Title IX.  Justice Stevens cited the 
policy guidelines released by the United States Department of Education through its Office of 
Civil Rights.  “[T]he Department’s interpretation of the statute wholly supports the conclusion 
that..[Lago Vista] is liable in damages for . . .[the teacher’s] sexual abuse of his students, which 
was made possible only by. . .[the teacher’s] affirmative misuse of his authority as her teacher.” 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72).  (internal citations omitted) 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: 
Harassment of Students or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12039 (1997). 
 181. Id. at 2004. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id.  He added, “[i]ndeed, the rule that the Court adopts would preclude a damages 
remedy even if every teacher at the school knew about the harassment but did not have authority 
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the new rule as inferior to common law agency principles and rules but 
accused the Court of failing to justify its rule.184  He asserted that the “Court 
bears the burden of justifying its rather dramatic departure from settled law, 
and to explain why its opinion fails to shoulder that burden.”185 
Justice Stevens dismissed the other rationales proffered by the Court for its 
rule.186  First, he found the Court’s reliance on a comparison between Title IX 
and Title VII in its analysis to be  erroneous.187  He argued that Congress’ 
failure to provide for the recovery of monetary damages in other civil rights 
statutes did not bar recovery of monetary damages under Title IX.188  Justice 
Stevens relied on the Court’s ruling in Franklin, and concluded the Franklin 
ruling dispelled the notion that monetary damages were not available under 
Title IX.189  He noted the Franklin Court “concluded that the same contextual 
approach used to justify an implied right of action more than amply 
demonstrate[d] the lack of any legislative intent to abandon the traditional 
presumption in favor of all available remedies.”190 
Secondly, Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s conclusion that the 
school district was unaware that it could be held liable for the individual 
misconduct of one of its employees who sexually harasses a student.191  He 
argued that school district counsel could have assumed based on Court 
precedent that they would be held liable for sexual harassment by a teacher 
against a student because sexual harassment is a violation of Title IX’s 
conditions for grant recipients.192  He concluded that the majority’s reliance on 
the administrative enforcement scheme of Title VI was inappropriate because 
few students would be able to succeed under the high standard imposed by the 
majority’s rule.193 
 
to institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf.”  Id. at 2004 (citing the majority opinion 
at 1993 (internal quotes omitted)). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  He commented that the Court was wrong to conclude that the ruling did not effect a 
student’s right to recovery.  Id at 2004, n. 11.  For example, Gebser’s ‘1983 claim was dismissed 
on summary judgment and the state law Aimmunize[d] school districts from tort liability in cases 
like this one. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.  Furthermore, Justice Stevens found that the cap on the amount of damages available 
had “no bearing on when damages may be recovered from a defendant in a Title IX case,” and the 
amount of damages recoverable was not of issue in the Gebser case.  Id. at 2005. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.  at 2005 (citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  Justice Stevens was referring to the Court’s holding in Franklin which preceded 
Waldrop’s misconduct toward Gebser. 
 193. Id. at 2006. 
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Finally, Justice Stevens wrote, it is “not relevant . . .whether the school 
district or the injured student should bear the risk of harm—a risk against 
which the district, but not the student, can insure.”194  He accused the majority 
of finding the protection of the school districts “purse” higher than the 
protection of its students.195  He summarized his dissent reiterating that absent 
further justification, the majority’s new rule thwarted the purpose of Title IX, 
which was to protect students from gender discrimination.196 
Justice Ginsburg joined by Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer, agreed with 
Justice Stevens dissent, but went a step farther in an effort to provide guidance 
to future litigants.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent sought to address an issue left 
open by the majority opinion and Justice Steven’s dissent: “whether a [school] 
district should be relieved from damages liability if it has in place, and 
effectively publicizes and enforces, a policy to curtail and redress injuries 
caused by sexual harassment.”197  Justice Ginsburg asserted that the issue 
should be addressed because: “(1)the dimensions of a claim are determined not 
only by the plaintiff’s allegations; but by the allowable defenses and (2) this 
Court’s pathmarkers are needed to afford guidance to lower Courts and school 
officials responsible for implementation of Title IX.”198  Justice Ginsburg 
advocated a rule which would allow school districts to assert an affirmative 
defense if they had an effective policy to address issues of sexual 
harassment,199 the school district would bear the burden of asserting the 
affirmative defense.200  Justice Ginsburg found support for her position in the 
procedures and regulations released by the Department of Education which 
instruct school districts to “install procedures for prompt and equitable 
resolutions of complaints. . .and the Department of Education’s Office of Civil 
Rights. . . detailed elements of an effective grievance process, with specific 
reference to sexual harassment.”201 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The agency principles of employer liability advocated by Gebser should 
not apply to Title IX claims because neither the statute nor its regulations 
indicate a Congressional intent to impose common law liability on 
 
 194. Id. at 2007 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 2007. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. ‘106.8(b)(1997)); 62 Fed.Reg. 12034, 12044-12045 (1997) (internal 
quotes omitted). 
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employers.202  Title IX regulations are framed around the presumption of notice 
and opportunity.203  The regulations prohibit government agencies from 
withdrawing federal funds or taking any other enforcement action until a 
school district has received notice of its noncompliance with the conditions of 
Title IX.204  The notice is required to give the school district the opportunity to 
remedy the discrimination before the government commences enforcement 
proceedings.205  After a school district is given notice and the opportunity to 
rectify its discriminatory practice(s), the government may commence 
enforcement proceedings if the school district has not come into compliance 
with Title IX’s requirements.206 
The Title IX guidelines support the majority conclusion that school 
districts may only be held liable for their official actions.207  For example, 
school districts must officially disseminate their policies against gender 
discrimination, and must officially make institutional decisions which adhere 
to that policy to uphold their contract with the government under Title IX.208  
This does not coincide with common law agency principles which hold 
employers liable for acts and decisions of employees which may not be 
authorized as official acts of the employer. 
It may be inferred from the regulations that the government is hesitant to 
punish school districts that are willing to comply with the Title IX 
requirements.  It may also be inferred that Congress and the appropriate 
regulatory agencies are aware that Title IX is broad and unclear, so rather than 
hold school districts responsible for interpreting the act, the government will 
grant school district’s the opportunity to redeem themselves should they 
unknowingly act in a discriminatory manner.209 
The majority did not stray from precedent but rather continued its practice 
of carefully interpreting overly broad and unclear statutes.  Cannon remains 
intact because students still may bring a private right of action against school 
 
 202. See 20 U.S.C. ‘1681.  As the majority noted, the statute does not include any language 
referring to the common law agency principles.  See Gebser, 118 S.Ct. 1995-6. 
 203. See 34 C.F.R. 100.8(c),(d). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See 34. C.F.R. ‘106.9.  The regulations require schools to disseminate their policy 
against gender discrimination to all “applicants for admission and employment, students and 
parents of elementary and secondary school students, employees, sources or referral of applicants 
for admission and employment. . .” 
 208. Id. 
 209. Both the majority and dissenting opinions note that Title IX is broad and unclear.  See 
generally Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 1989.  Both the majority and dissent drew upon a variety of 
sources to aid them in interpreting the statute because the language and the legislative history did 
not clearly indicate the goals of Congress in enacting the statute. 
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districts for violations of Title IX.210  Franklin, also remains intact because 
monetary damages may still be available under Title IX;211 the Court’s opinion 
merely limits the application of the Franklin rule. 
The Gebser rule is beneficial to future litigants seeking recovery of 
monetary damages from school districts, because it expressly tells plaintiffs 
what elements they need to prove to recover monetary damages from 
employers.  The Gebser rule lays the foundation for making a successful claim 
under Title IX for the recovery of monetary damages from school districts.  
Before Gebser, students were left to wonder what standard of liability the 
courts would impose on a school district.  Now the last element of proving a 
Title IX claim is laid out for plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs need to show that  (1) they 
notified someone about the harassment, (2) the person notified had the 
authority to act to remedy the harassment, and (3) the individual, once notified, 
failed to act appropriately to end the harassment, i.e. acted with deliberate 
indifference.212 
The majority’s reliance on the text of the statute and its regulations as 
guidance in fashioning a remedy, aided the Court in refraining from exceeding 
the scope of Title IX.  The Court’s rule continues to protect students without 
inflicting financial ruin on schools receiving federal funds.  This is consistent 
with the purpose of the statute, which is to protect students from sex 
discrimination, while also seeking to provide much needed financial assistance 
to educational institutions.  Furthermore, the Court’s analysis is consistent with 
the regulatory scheme fashioned by the rules released by the Department of 
Education.213  As the majority opinion noted, the Department of Education 
presumed that some notice would be given to school districts so that they may 
have the opportunity to remedy any discriminatory practices.214  Contrary to 
Justice Stevens interpretation of the Court’s ruling, the Court did not imply that 
school districts were unaware that sexual harassment by a teacher against a 
student was a violation of Title IX.  Rather the majority implied that the text of 
the statute, when read closely, penalized schools which act officially to 
 
 210. See Ely, supra n. 2. 
 211. Id.  Although, a criticism of the Gebser rule, the article accurately described the amount 
of skill used by the Court to avoid disrupting Franklin.  However, Ely drew the wrong conclusion 
from the Court’s crafty preservation of the rule in Franklin.  The new rule is crafty because it is 
advisory in nature.  The majority offers guidance to future litigants by expressly telling them what 
is necessary to make a successful claim for damages. 
 212. The opinion also described what actions might be an appropriate response to a student’s 
complaints of sexual harassment.  For example, the Court was satisfied with the Lago Vista 
School District’s handling of Gebser’s situation.  The teacher was dismissed.  Dismissal of a 
teacher was an appropriate response to a student’s complaints of hostile environment sexual 
harassment. 
 213. See 34 C.F.R. 106.8(b)(1997). 
 214. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 2000. 
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discriminate against students on the basis of gender.215  The school district in 
Gebser was unaware that it could be held liable for actions that were not the 
official actions of the school.  To hold a school district liable for unofficial 
actions of its employees would be contrary to the express statutory language of 
Title IX.  Consequently, the Court’s ruling did not thwart the purpose of Title 
IX. 
Public policy strongly advocates a narrow scope of liability for schools to 
protect school districts and students.  All the Justices acknowledged that the 
ruling was not beneficial to the victims of sexual harassment.216  Students bear 
the burden of talking about an embarrassing and hurtful experience at the 
hands of a trusted adult.  While placing a great burden upon students in 
proving their claims, however, the ruling also challenged Congress to amend 
Title IX for the safety of students.217  In addition, schools were put on notice 
that they may be held liable for damages if they neglect to heed a student’s 
complaints.  Many schools may take this ruling and promulgate stringent 
sexual harassment policies to avoid lengthy and costly litigation and to protect 
its student body.  Although the ruling shields schools from liability when there 
is no notice of the sexual harassment, the ruling also posed several new 
questions.  For example: What exactly is notice? Who must give notice?  Who 
has the authority to address the issue of sexual harassment? And what type of 
action is reasonable and adequate to address the issue of sexual harassment?218 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s ruling in Gebser should be viewed as a challenge to Congress 
and schools, not as a burden upon the victims of teacher-student sexual 
harassment.  The Court  challenged Congress to amend Title IX to clarify its 
position regarding the types of damages that should be awarded to private 
litigants and in what instances.  In addition, the Court delivered a strong 
message to schools.  School districts must begin to acknowledge the 
seriousness of sexual harassment and address the issue now, before Congress 
does act and the holding in Gebser is superceded by an amendment to Title IX. 
Despite the unpopularity of the holding, the Gebser decision shed much-
needed light on the issue of sexual harassment.  The numerous articles written 
regarding the decision and the cases pending in the Supreme Court are 
evidence that neither students nor schools are willing to sit back and allow 
 
 215. See 20 U.S.C. ‘1681 (1994). 
 216. Gebser, 118 S.Ct. at 2000 (majority opinion), Id. at 2006 (Justice Stevens dissenting), Id. 
at 2007 (Justice Ginsburg dissenting). 
 217. Id. at 2000. 
 218. See Marczely, supra n.1 . 
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